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THE
INTEREST
OF
GREAT BRITAIN

Steadily pursued.

In Answer to a Pamphlet, entitl'd,

*The Case of the HANOVER Forces
impartially and freely examined.
by Horatio Lord Walpole*

PART I.

The SECOND EDITION.

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THE Author of a late Libel, entitled, *The Case of the Hanover Forces*, not content to misrepresent and vilify, in the usual Stile of such Scribblers, the Characters and Conduct of Ministers, has dared to arraign his late and present Majesty in a most audacious and seditious Manner; as if they had, ever since their Accession to the Throne of these Kingdoms, in all their Views, Treaties and Measures, *made an open and manifest Sacrifice of the British Interest and Glory Abroad, to their Electoral Dominions.*

A Charge so heinous, so big with the most dangerous Consequences, should have been made out by undeniable Facts, supported with such strong Reasonings and Conclusions, as are not to be refuted: Instead of which, Scraps of various, indigested Matters, destitute of Sense and Truth, without Dates or Connection, are scatter'd up and down,

with a most virulent and malicious Intent, to alienate the Affections of the People, and to raise in them a Spirit of Jealousy and Rebellion against his Majesty's Person and Government.

Be it remember'd, says this Libeller, that his late Majesty had no sooner taken Possession of the Throne, than he entertained Thoughts of aggrandizing his Electoral Dominions, though a Rebellion then raged in the Heart of the Kingdom, almost half his Subjects were disaffected, and the Pretender actually landed in Scotland. In pursuance of this favourite Project, Bremen and Verden were almost instantly purchased of Denmark, and Great Britain found herself engaged to guarantee the Possession of Sleswick to that Crown, and saddled with a Vote of Credit of 250,000 l. to put us in Security against the Resentments of the King of Sweden.

A Rupture between the two Kingdoms immediately followed; the King as Elector first declar'd War, in virtue of his late Alliance with Denmark; and a British Fleet being next dispatch'd to the Baltick, to compel Sweden to connive at the Wrong which had been done her, or to accept a large Sum of Money by way of Recompence.

A plain and true State of Circumstances and Dates in order of Time, relative to these Transactions, will sufficiently expose, without any *Gloss* or *specious Pretences*, the Malice and Grossness of the Libeller's Misrepresentations of the Causes and Consequences of them.

The violent, not to say mad Proceedings of the late King of Sweden, in rejecting the Treaty of
Neutra-

Neutrality concerted by *England* and *Holland*, and other Members of the Grand Alliance, for preserving the Remains of his Army under General *Crassau*, and for the Security of his *German* Dominions; and in causing the Ships of all Nations whatsoever, without Distinction, trading to the *Baltick*, to be seized and confiscated, even some Years before his late Majesty's Accession to the Throne; obliged, at last, the late King and the States, after having made proper Instances (for Redress) to no purpose, to send strong Squadrons for the Protection of their Subjects in their Navigation and Commerce to those Parts.

The *British* and *Dutch* Ministers had jointly, or separately, made these Instances in the most earnest Manner, by Variety of Memorials deliver'd yearly to the King, or Senate of *Sweden*, so long as from 1710, without being able to obtain the least Satisfaction.

Mr. *Jackson's* last Memorial before the Squadrons were sent, complaining that the Loss of the *British* Merchants from *Swedish* Cruizers amounted to 65,449 *l.* Sterling, was presented to the Senate at *Stockholm*, January the 14th 1714.

The *British* and *Dutch* Fleets, for the Security of the Trade of their Subjects, sail'd to the *Baltick*, in May 1715.

The Treaty between *Denmark* and *Hanover*, for the Purchase of *Bremen* and *Verden*, was not concluded till July the 26th in the same Year; and the King, as Elector of *Hanover*, did not declare War against *Sweden* till October following.

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The *British* Fleet therefore was sent to the *Baltick*, to protect the Trade of the *British* Subjects some Months before, in consequence of Complaints made in vain by a *British* Minister, of violent Depredations committed by the *Swedes* upon the *British* Trade, several Years before the Conclusion of the Treaty between *Denmark* and *Hanover* for the Purchase of *Bremen* and *Verden*, and the Declaration of War by the King, as Elector, against *Sweden*: And this was done in Concert with the *States*, who can never be supposed to have taken a Measure of so great Expence and Consequence, to procure or secure those Dutchies to the Electorate of *Hanover*. And yet this Libeller, in order to blacken the Memory of that good Prince the late King, has the Impudence to advance, That his Majesty, as Elector, had *first* declared War against *Sweden*, in virtue of that Alliance with *Denmark*; and that a *British* Fleet was *next* sent up to the *Baltick*, to compel *Sweden* to connive at the Wrong which had been done her.

Had he had the least Curiosity to look into Dates, he would have found that the Treaty for the Purchase of *Bremen* and *Verden* was concluded with *Denmark*, by the King as Elector, *July* 26th 1715. But the Rebellion did not break out till *September* 1715. Nor the Pretender arrive in *Scotland* till *December* following. But this Exactness would not have answer'd his villanous Intention of making the People of *Great Britain* believe, that the late King was so intent upon increasing his Electoral Dominions, as to be entirely careless and indifferent about the Arrival of the Pretender in *Scotland*, and all the calamitous Consequences that might overtake his
faithful

faithful *British* Subjects from a Rebellion raging in the Heart of the Nation. But whatever might have been the Time of purchasing *Bremen* and *Verden*, or if they had never been purchased at all, the same Spirit of Rebellion would have prevail'd at that Time ; the same Spirit which now actuates and influences this Libeller, and his Abettors, to endeavour, under the Mask of Patriotism, to raise and foment another Rebellion, by inculcating into the Minds of the People so base an Aspersion upon his late and present Majesty's Conduct, as the having had no other View, in all their foreign Transactions, than to sacrifice the Blood and Treasure of their *British* Subjects to aggrandize the *German* Dominions.

But as a *British*, as well as a *Dutch* Squadron, was likewise sent in 1716 to the *Baltick*, it is possible that the Libeller may pretend that he points at this Fleet as equipp'd and employed in consequence of the Treaty between *Denmark* and *Hanover* about *Bremen* and *Verden*, and of the War declared by the King, as Elector, against *Sweden*. But this will by no means answer his wicked Purpose ; for the Continuation of the *Swedish* Depredations in those Seas against the Subjects of *Great Britain* and *Holland*, made it necessary for them to continue to send Fleets, as they both did in 1716, to prevent them. And indeed, the King of *Sweden*'s Behaviour was so outrageous and extravagant, that, contrary to the Advice of his own Regency, he rejected with Haughtiness and Scorn the prudent Means projected by his Friends, in which the late King was the most earnest, to prevent his entire Ruin. And not content with exerting his Resentment against his declared Enemies in the *North*, he, like a Drawcansir, not only molested,
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without the least Provocation, the Navigation and Commerce of the Maritime Powers, extremely well disposed in his Favour, but also encouraged Troubles against his late Majesty, as King of *Great Britain*. Mr. *Jackson*, the *British* Minister, in his Memorial of *June* the 15th 1716, representing to the *Swedish* Senate the Motives for sending a *British* Squadron that Year to the *Baltick*, as being principally done for the Security of the *British* Trade in those Parts; takes Notice likewise of the Refuge and Protection granted by *Sweden* to the *Scotch* Rebels, and of the *Swedish* Expedition to *Norway*. This Memorial is conceiv'd in Terms extremely moderate, if compar'd with the desperate Designs which the *Swedish* Ministers had meditated and projected against his late Majesty's *British* Government and Dominions, as appeared in 1716 by the ample Discovery that was made from Count *Gylleberg's* Papers: And there is no manner of doubt, if the King of *Sweden* had lived to have conquer'd *Norway*, but he would have made some Attempt upon this Kingdom in Favour of the Pretender: And the Libeller himself seems to confess it, by saying, *He became a most exasperated Enemy; as, had his Life been prolonged, we might have had more fatal Experience.*

As to the 250,000*l.* the strong Proofs of an unjust, but implacable Hatred conceiv'd by a Prince so stubborn and relentless in all his Purposes, against his late Majesty, and his *British* Government, occasioned the Demand that was made by the Crown, and granted by the Parliament the 12th of *March* 1717, of 250,000*l.* to enable the King to concert such Measures with foreign Princes and States, as might prevent any Charge or Apprehensions

ons from the Designs of Sweden for the future. So that the King of *Sweden* was not made an exasperated Enemy, as the Libeller would insinuate, from the voting this Sum of Money; but the dangerous Designs which he and his Ministers had manifested before against this Nation, by protecting and harbouring the fugitive Rebels, and by endeavouring to raise a new Rebellion, as well as by the piratical Depredations exercised on our Trade in the *Baltick*, and increased every Year from 1710 to that Time, made it necessary to grant such a Supply for negotiating Measures with other foreign Princes, in Opposition to such a desperate Enemy; and as such Measures could not be negotiated but with the utmost Secresy, it was equally necessary to repose a Confidence in the King with regard to the Disposition of it.

But it is impossible for the Libeller, or any of his Abettors, to insinuate, that any Part of this Money granted in *April* 1717. was apply'd to the Purchase of *Bremen* and *Verden*, which was bought of *Denmark*, and paid for in *July* 1715. Nor could it be given by way of *Recompence* to *Sweden* to put up a Quarrel they were not in a proper Condition to prosecute with Advantage; because from the Time that Subsidy was granted in *April* 1717, to the Death of the King of *Sweden*, which happened in *December* 1718, the *British* Minister at *Stockholm* was kept in the most rigorous and close Confinement, in Resentment for the just but gentle Treatment which Count *Gylleberg* had met with here for conspiring against the Government. And indeed all Intercourse between that Court and this was entirely cut off; nor was any Quarrel with *Sweden* made up until the signing the Preliminary Treaty in 1719.

The Libeller's Suggestion with regard to *Sleswick*, as if Great Britain found herself instantly engaged to guarantee the Possession of it to Denmark, upon the Purchase of *Bremen* and *Verden*, will by Facts and Dates appear to be entirely groundless.

Bremen and *Verden* were purchased in 1715, but the Guarantee of Great Britain for *Sleswick* was not asked until 1719, when we and France came to employ our joint Mediation for obtaining a Peace from Denmark for Sweden. Then indeed this Guarantee was insisted on by Denmark, as a Condition *sine qua non*, for her making Peace with that Crown; and accordingly the Instrument for granting it on the Part of the King in that Quality was not signed by the late Lord *Polwarth* till the 23d of July 1720, the very Day on which the Treaty of Peace between Sweden and Denmark was ratified.

A Guarantee of the same Nature was given three Weeks before by France; who cannot be supposed to have interested herself in so particular a Manner, for securing to his late Majesty the Possession of *Bremen* and *Verden*; and it appears by the express Words of that Act, that it was given as a Means for obtaining from Denmark the Restitution of the Swedish Territories, then remaining in the Possession of that Crown. To which may be added, that the King of Denmark's Pretensions for keeping *Sleswick* were at that time acknowledged by the Czar just and well founded, on account of the House of *Holstein* having invited the Swedish Army into *Sleswick*, and having by a clandestine Treaty, agreed to admit them into the strong Fortrefs of *Tonningen*. And the Possession of *Sleswick* has

has in effect been since confirmed to *Denmark* by the late Emperor and *Muscovy* in their Treaty of 1732, in which they stipulated an Equivalent in Money for the Duke of *Holstein*, allowing him two Years to accept of it. Neither has it ever been pretended, that *Great Britain*, or any of the other Powers concerned, have incurr'd the least Expence or Inconvenience on account of this Guarantee. But we must at all times be greatly concerned for the Preservation of Peace between the Northern Powers, as being, for the sake of that essential Part of our Commerce which relates to Naval Stores, much more the Interest of this Nation than it can be of *Hanover*.

To conclude this Article relating to *Bremen* and *Verden*, which has made so great a Noise in the World: The War between *Denmark* and *Sweden*, which occasioned the Loss of those Dutchies, was declared in 1709. His *Danish* Majesty possess'd himself of *Stade*, and the *Dutchy* of *Bremen* in 1712: The King, as Elector, employ'd all that time his most friendly and earnest Endeavours to pacify the Troubles in the *North*, and to preserve to *Sweden* all her Territories in the Empire; first by promoting and joining in the Treaty concerted by the Members of the Grand Alliance in 1711, for procuring a perfect Neutrality for those Provinces; and for joining an Army of 15,000 Men to the *Swedish* Troops under General *Craffau*, for repelling any Invasion of them: Which Treaty was agreed to by the Regency of *Sweden*, but rejected in the most haughty Manner by their head-strong King. Next, by obtaining for him from the King of *Prussia*, in *October*

ber 1713, a Treaty of Sequestration for *Pomerania*, which was agreed to by *Sweden*, but soon after violated by that Crown. And lastly, by procuring a Congress of all the Powers concerned, to be opened at *Brunswick* in 1714, for pacifying the Troubles of the *North*. His *Swedish* Majesty, by an unaccountable Obstinacy, not only render'd all these good Offices fruitless, but made use of the most ungrateful Menaces to the King, as Elector, in return for those good Offices; and being actually marching a strong Army into the Heart of the *Lower Saxony* in the beginning of the Year 1715. Then it was, and not before, that *Prussia* declared War against *Sweden* the 28th of *April*; that his Majesty, as Elector, made the Treaty with *Denmark* the 26th of *July*, for the Purchase of *Bremen* and *Verden*; on some Parts of which he had such considerable Mortgages from the Crown of *Sweden*, as made it prudent to secure the Possession of the Whole from *Denmark* for 600,000 Rixdollars. Since which, *Sweden* has made an absolute Cession, and granted the perpetual Guarantee of them by Treaty to the late King, as Elector, for the Sum of One Million of Rixdollars, paid at *Hamburg* by the Treasury of that Electorate in 1719 and 1720. Now, whether it be most for the Interest of *Great Britain*, that those Countries which command the Navigation of the *Elbe* and *Weser*, the only Inlets from the *British* Seas in *Germany*, and which in case of any Disturbance in the *North* are most capable of protecting, or interrupting the *British* Trade to *Hamburg*, should remain in the Hands of *Denmark*, who has frequently formed Pretensions on that City ;

or

or of *Sweden*, who molested our Commerce in the *Baltick*, rather than be annex'd for ever to the King's Electoral Dominions, is a Question which can easily be decided by a bare Inspection into the Map of *Europe*. Thus, in *October* 1715, when all other Means of bringing the King of *Sweden* to Reason proved ineffectual, his Majesty, as Elector, was the very last of all the neighbouring Powers that declared War against that Crown.

As to the Objection of *Sweden's* becoming, from an old Ally, an inveterate Enemy to Great Britain on this Account, it is false in Fact. The late King of *Sweden* had begun to interrupt our Trade, and that of all other Nations, in the *Baltick* in Queen *Anne's* Reign, and continu'd the same Obstinacy all his Life. But the Moment he died, our ancient Amity with the Crown of *Sweden* was restored, our Minister was receiv'd with open Arms at *Stockholm*, and Great Britain was acknowledg'd the Deliverer of that Kingdom, by mediating Treaties of Peace for it with all its Neighbours. From a Review of these Circumstances, many of which are previous to the late King's Accession to the Throne of Great Britain, it cannot be doubted, but that the Elector of *Hanover* wou'd have purchased *Bremen* and *Verden* had he not been King of Great Britain; and the King of Great Britain, from an indispenfible Duty to protect the Rights of his *British* Subjects, must have sent those Fleets into the *Baltick* had he not been Elector of *Hanover*.

But

But the Libeller says, *Russia had given Offence to the Court of Hanover, by interfering in the Affairs of Mecklenberg, which, on account both of its Extent and Situation, would have made a noble Addition to his Majesty's Electoral Dominions: Russia therefore was to be humbled, and Great Britain was taxed to accomplish what was out of the Power of Hanover.*

Now until the Libeller is pleased to state and explain the Facts, whereby *Russia*, by interfering in the Affairs of *Mecklenberg*, had given Offence to the Court of *Hanover*, more than to the other Princes and States of the Empire, who being all justly alarm'd at the Czar's having presented a Petition at the Diet of *Ratibon*, for getting himself acknowledged a Prince of the Empire, and at his various Endeavours to gain a permanent Footing in *Germany*, had all joined in obtaining repeated Rescripts from the Emperor for his withdrawing his Troops; and till he explains how, and in what respect, *Great Britain* was taxed to accomplish what was out of the Power of *Hanover*; what that Accomplishment was, and how it operated for the Benefit of *Hanover*, of all which he says not one Tittle, it is unnecessary to detain the Reader with Observations upon such a vague and insignificant Insinuation.

But during these Commotions in the North, says the Libeller, it was found convenient to enter into a Treaty with the Emperor: A Treaty was accordingly agreed upon in 1716. This is the first time that I ever heard this Alliance, among the great Variety of scandalous Ribaldry against Nego-

Negotiations and Treaties, censur'd, as being made to serve *Hanoverian* Purposes. Let us see how he endeavours to make it out: It is because the Emperor, and his late Majesty, *engage mutually to defend and preserve each other in the Possession of the Kingdoms, Provinces, and Rights, (in the Condition they now are) which they actually held and enjoy'd.* Thus far it is purely a defensive Alliance; for the Article, where those Words are, declares—*The Design and End of this Alliance to be no other than mutually to defend, &c.* But it follows afterwards, that they are to defend and preserve, not only what each Ally possesses at the Time of this Alliance, *but what, during the same, they shall by mutual Consent acquire; which, the Libeller says, was to be understood as a sufficient Guarantee for whatever Hanover had, or should acquire in the North.* Why so? These Acquisitions cannot be made till after one or other of the Allies (according to the express Words of the same Article) *shall be hostily invaded or molested by another Power in the Possessions they actually enjoy;* and these Acquisitions cannot be made, *but by mutual Consent.* And the Libeller does not point out one Expression, to shew that the *Hanover* Dominions are guaranteed by this Treaty; nor one Measure pursu'd by the Emperor and his late Majesty in Consequence of this Treaty, to prove that Acquisitions were to be made in the *North*: And as to the Words, *of what they shall acquire by mutual Consent,* they are no more than what are usually inserted in defensive Alliances; and the same Words may be found in the third Article of the defensive Alliance concluded between his
late

late Majesty and the *States*, *February* the 6th
1715-6.

This might be sufficient in Answer to the forced and malicious Interpretations of this Caviller. But in Vindication of his late Majesty's Honour, so basely traduced by him, it will appear that this Alliance made with the Emperor in 1716, far from having the least Relation to *Hanover*, took its Rise from a Motive that immediately regarded the Security of the *British* Government and Dominions.

The late Duke of *Orleans*, as soon as he became Regent of *France*, gave too much Reason to suspect his Countenance, or at least Connivance, at an Enterprize that was projected before the Death of *Lewis* the XIVth, and was secretly carrying on in *France*, for an Invasion and Rebellion in *Scotland* in Favour of the Pretender. Lord *Stair*, the then *British* Ambassador at *Paris*, touched with great Nicety and Skill, in an admirable Memorial he presented at that time to the Regent, on the several Preparations and Steps taken privately in *France* to support the Invasion; and his late Majesty thought no Time was to be lost to conclude a defensive Treaty with the Emperor, as a Foundation for forming a new Grand Alliance against *France*, in case the Regent should openly espouse the Cause of the Pretender. The *Dutch* were immediately invited to come into this Treaty. The dilatory Forms of their Government, as usual, retarded their Accession; but the Apprehensions of it, and of civil Comotions fomented by Prince *Cellamare* at that time

time against the Regency of the Duke of *Orleans*, and the Pretender's Disappointment by the Defeat of the Rebels in *Scotland*, made such an Impression upon him, as disposed him to take a quite different Turn, and to seek his late Majesty's Friendship; in consequence of which, the defensive Alliance between *Great Britain*, *France*, and the *States*, was concluded Jan. the 4th 1717.

By this Treaty the Works of *Mardyke* were destroyed, the Removal of the Pretender from *Avignon* to the other Side of the *Alps*, the Succession of the Crown of *Great Britain* in the Protestant Line, as well as that of *France*, according to the Treaties of *Utrecht*, were stipulated and guaranteed. And the impudent Libeller might, with as much Colour of Reason, have affirmed, that this Treaty (on which he is entirely silent) as well as that of 1716, with the Emperor, was understood to guarantee the *Dominions of Hanover*, and to make new Acquisitions in the North for that *Electorate*.

After an ironical Sneer upon the Advantages resulting to *Great Britain* from the Treaty of 1716, the Libeller pours out Variety of Matter, without regard to Dates, Connexion, or Truth; and consequently without the least Evidence to prove his fundamental *Thesis*, That the Riches and Strength of this Nation had been made subservient to the Interest and Views of *Hanover*.

Upon a Misunderstanding, he says, between the Emperor and Spain, the last forms a Design to make himself Master of Sicily; upon which the

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Emperor calls upon us to fulfil our Engagements. This draws on the bold Stroke in 1718; in consequence whereof, as before Sweden, Spain of a firm Friend became an implacable Enemy. — Though this Cavalier Step had been taken in Favour of the Emperor, his Imperial Majesty, for certain Reasons which will speedily be explained, (but never are explain'd) is to be made sensible of our Importance in making Peace as well as War, in order that Hanover might for the future rely more securely upon his Friendship and Protection; as Great Britain had already been made the Bubble of the War, she was now to be made the Bubble of the Peace. As Spain had been provoked, so likewise Spain must be appeased. Thus, to bring the Court of Vienna to a proper Sense of Things, and pacify the Heart-burnings of that of Madrid, Gibraltar was to be surrender'd on one hand, and the eventual Succession of Don Carlos to Tuscany, Parma, and Placentia, was to be provided for, by the Quadruple Alliance, on the other.

*The Year before was made memorable by a Multiplicity of Treaties and Partitions then agitating or concluded in the North, during which, it appear'd that the Emperor was not so implicitly the humble Servant of the Court of Hanover, as had been expected in virtue of the Treaty of 1716, and the Services done him by Great Britain since. In particular, he was far from joining in the Project before mentioned of humbling Russia — From the Moment that the Emperor ceased to co-operate in the great Work of aggrandizing Hanover, it was discovered that the overgrown Power of the House of Austria became dangerous to the Liberties of Europe, and resolved to reduce it within a proper Bound: But as this was not to be effected
only*

only by the secret Treaty of Madrid, we at the same time threw ourselves into the Arms of France, and acted by the Directions of her Ministers without reserve; which will serve to account for the Part we took in the Quarrel between the French and Spanish Courts, the refusing of the sole Mediation between Spain and the Emperor, and the involving ourselves in the Hanover Alliance.

This is the terrible Indictment by which the Memory of the late King stands arraign'd by this infamous Libeller before the People of Great Britain, as having never once thought of the Interest of Great Britain, unless it was to sacrifice it to that of Hanover.

It would be endless to unravel and expose the Confusion of Treaties and Facts crowded here together without Regard to Circumstances or Time. Let us therefore see what Evidence the Libeller produces to support this severe Indictment.

Now that the said (Hanover) Alliance was calculated only for the Preservation of Lower Saxony, or rather to support and defend the new Possessions and Claims of the Electorate of Hanover, is beyond all Controversy made appear by the Writings and Speeches of those in Opposition to the late Minister; as likewise that the present exorbitant Power of the House of Austria was no better than a political Bugbear, to be found no where, no not in the Brain of those who endeavoured most to have it mistaken for a Reality; — Consequently that all the Millions squandered by us on that Occasion, served only to exhaust ourselves, and avenge the Cause of Hanover upon the House of Austria.

So that this Libeller, to make good an Accusation of the most atrocious Nature against the late King, that can be brought against a Sovereign Prince, as if he had betray'd the great Trust reposed in him for the Protection of his Subjects, *by exhausting their Strength and Wealth, purely to support and defend the Possessions of a foreign Country*, has, by his own Confession, produced no Evidence at all, but refers the Reader to the Writings and Speeches of others, as having done it beyond all Controversy.

Now since this Matter has been controverted, I may as well take upon me to affirm, as I am fully convinced of it, that the Writings and Speeches in Parliament have beyond all *Controversy* proved, that the Treaties and Measures pursued by his late Majesty were calculated and undertaken, and more particularly the famous Treaty of *Hanover*, for no other Purpose or Intent, than the Preservation and Security of the *British* Dominions and Government, and the Rights and Privileges of *British* Subjects. And my Affirmation in this Case must be acknowledged to carry as full Evidence and Conviction, as his can do. I might join Issue with him here; but I will go further, and by barely stating, in as short a Manner as possible, the Times and Circumstances when the Treaties were made, the plain Sense and Meaning of them, and the Measures pursued in consequence of them; I don't doubt but it will appear to every equitable Reader, that the Interest of *Great Britain* was principally, and even solely consulted by them; and that this Libeller will
stand

stand convicted of being a most notorious, false Accuser.

But before I enter into a further Detail of these Facts, it may be proper to state and explain a general Proposition, to be proved in the Sequel of this Discourse, which is, That the late King, and his present Majesty, from their Accession to the Crown, in all their foreign Transactions, where this Nation has been concerned, steadily pursued one uniform Plan, calculated, according to the Circumstances and Situation of Affairs, to secure the Protestant Succession, to defend their *British* Possessions, and the Rights and Privileges of their *British* Subjects, and to maintain the Peace and Balance of *Europe*, as necessary to these great Ends.

The first Grand Alliance in 1689, and in consequence of it, that which was made *Sept.* the 3d 1701, between the Emperor, *Great Britain*, and the *States General*, wisely provided, as a necessary and fundamental Rule to be observed at all Times, *That whether the Satisfaction aimed at by the contracting Parties should be obtain'd by amicable Compact without a War, or by a Treaty of Peace after a War, there should remain between the said Parties a perpetual defensive Alliance for the Guarantee of such Compact or Treaty.*

Had the last general Peace, after such a glorious Course of wonderful Successes, been negotiated and made upon this salutary Principle, by a joint Concert of all the contracting Parties of the Grand Alliance, for securing to them their mutual Rights and Pretensions, according to their respective Treaties, they might, by the Bond of such an useful Guarantee, have continued
as

as firmly and advantageously united in Time of Peace, as they had been during the War. The Protestant Succession of these Kingdoms, our Possessions and Privileges of Trade, with the Tranquility and Balance of *Europe*, might have rested securely upon so solid and lasting a Basis.

But the unfortunate Treaty of *Utrecht*, to say no worse, projected and concluded by clandestine Intrigues, and the Influence of *France*, directing the *British* Councils and Measures, dissipated, broke and confounded at once that formidable Confederacy, which had been framed with so much Wisdom and Policy, and supported with so much Glory and Success: And such Resentments, Jealousies, and Distrusts were raised among the Allies, as destroy'd all Confidence for the future, and left little Possibility of their being brought to unite together in any Emergency whatsoever: And far from procuring the least Hopes of a durable Peace in *Europe*, the most essential Point, and one of the principal Causes of the War, that of settling the Pretensions to the *Spanish* Monarchy by a mutual Agreement between the two contending Powers, *Austria* and *Spain*, remained undetermined; and each of them in a fixt Resolution to lay hold of the first favourable Opportunity to make good her Claim to the Part of the *Spanish* Dominions in the Possession of the other.

In this loose and disjointed Situation his late Majesty found the Affairs of *Europe*, upon his Accession to the Throne. He found no Power but *France*, (who had indeed been humbled,
and

and might have been kept within due Limits) in a State of Triumph and Satisfaction. He found the Embers of a War half extinguished, still alive, and ready by the least Breath of Wind, to break forth and kindle a new and general Flame; and this Nation unhappily divided and distracted with Party Rage and Violence. He saw at the same time how difficult, not to to say impossible, it would be in a Case even of common Danger to put himself at the Head of such an illustrious Alliance as had been so shamefully dissolved; to reconcile the Minds of our antient and natural Friends the *Dutch*, to the same Confidence and Union with us, after so fatal an Experience of our Faith and Friendship; and to engage the People of *Great Britain* and *Holland*, loaded with such immense Debts by two long successive Wars, into the like Measures, after the Fruits of so much Blood and Treasure had been so unaccountably torn out of their Hands. He saw on the other side, that our Strength and Riches depend upon our Commerce and Correspondence with other Countries, and that Commerce, in a great Measure, upon the Preservation of Peace in *Europe*: That we have many Rivals on account of the Benefits and Extensiveness of our Trade; and that the Establishment of a Protestant Line in his Family, must unavoidably draw upon him the Envy of many Catholick Powers abroad, as well as the Disaffection of those at home that favour'd the Cause of the Pretender. He therefore saw that he could not depend upon the Protection of the Sea, as the only necessary Security and Advantage of this Nation; that he could not be lock'd up from all Intercourse with other Princes and States, but must stand in need of the Friendship
and

and Alliance of some of them, nor be entirely indifferent to their Councils, Treaties and Designs.

Under these Circumstances, What Scheme of Policy was it most prudent to follow with regard to foreign Concerns? What was to be done for the future, but to watch with Attention the Alliances, Views, and Motions of other Princes and States? And as any of them might directly or consequentially affect the Safety of this Government, the *British* Possessions and Privileges of Trade, or disturb the general Tranquility; to negotiate counter Alliances with such Powers and States, who, by having the same common Interest with us, might be willing to concur in proper Ways and Means to obstruct and prevent the Execution of those dangerous Designs, or to put the contracting Parties in a Condition to resist and defend themselves against the Execution of them.

This salutary Plan of *preventive and defensive Measures* has been the fundamental Rule of all his late and present Majesty's Counsels; the Rudder by which their Actions have been steadily and constantly steer'd, with respect to the Conduct of foreign Princes and States: Ever cautious not to plunge their faithful Subjects rashly into a ruinous War, and equally prepared and resolved to protect their just Rights against all Attempts from any Quarter whatsoever, should they be obliged to take up Arms for that Purpose.

Upon this Principle it may be, and indeed has been necessary to make, at different Times,
defensive

defensive Alliances in Conjunction with, or in Opposition to the same Powers, as the different Dispositions and Behaviour of those Powers might tend to the Benefit or Disadvantage of this Nation: And this seeming Change of Conduct will appear not to have arisen from Inconstancy of Temper, or of Views on our Part, but from the Variation of Views and Intentions on the Part of others.

Hence it follows, that the most formidable Nation, (tho' our old and inveterate Enemy) may, during a Minority, or under the Government of a prime Minister of a pacific and timid Disposition, become a very proper Ally to us, in a defensive Treaty, to check and prevent the Designs of another Prince, who, tho' formerly our Friend, may, out of Pride, Bigotry, and Ambition, have taken the Advantage of that Minority and pacifick Disposition, to form Schemes and Alliances detrimental to the Security and Rights of this Nation. And such a necessary Change of Parties in our Negotiations and Treaties, far from being a Variation, is a strict and uniform Pursuit of the same Principles, founded upon a providential Care and Concern for the Welfare of *Great Britain*. And considering the frequent Alterations that are made by Deaths, Marriages, and the Humours of Princes, or the Ministers that direct them in the Views and Measures of arbitrary Governments, sometimes not only contrary to the Ties of Friendship with other Nations, their ancient Allies, but even to the Interest of their own Subjects; it is impossible but free Governments, that have only the Welfare of their Country at heart, must also sometimes

be obliged, for their own Defence, to contract new Alliances, in Opposition to those Powers with whom they would have been willing to have lived in the strictest Friendship upon just and honourable Terms.

The Springs and Motives of these apparent Variations were generally so visible and obvious, that they could not be either mistaken or misrepresented. But sometimes it must have happen'd, that they depended on Intelligences and Discoveries of such a nature, as could not possibly be divulged without a Violation of Faith, and defeating the Confidence necessary for penetrating into the secret Machinations of our Enemies. And where-ever this has happen'd to be the Case, it could not fail, in a Nation divided like ours; a Nation where every Artifice of Calumny and Defamation has been practised with an Assiduity unknown to any other Age and Country; that the Demagogues and Tribunes of a mistaken People, the officious, weekly, monthly, and yearly Writers of Pamphlets, laying hold of the necessary Silence of the Government, must constantly have endeavour'd to put the most malicious Construction on every publick Transaction, which Wit and Malice, destitute of real Knowledge and Information, cou'd possibly suggest. These Falshoods being repeated till the Authors themselves, as well as their shallow and superficial Readers, believed them, have ever served as a Foundation for new and monstrous Superstructures of the same kind, which have at last grown up into a sort of System, or Body of political Tenets of Disaffection; and it is reckon'd Heresy and Infidelity among its Professors, to entertain the
least

least Doubt of it, or to admit any Evidence, however clear, that may shake the happy Security of Opinions they so blindly and tenaciously have adopted. And that the Performance now under Consideration is of this sort, will, I believe, be made appear to every impartial and dispassionate Reader.

I shall now proceed to shew, that the Motives and Contents of our several Treaties, as well as the Measures taken in consequence of them, were governed by this fundamental Rule of DEFENSIVE AND PREVENTIVE MEASURES, and that the Interest of *Great Britain* was principally and even solely consulted by them.

The defensive Alliance between his late Majesty and the *States*, concluded at *Westminster* the 6th of *February* 1715-16, has as yet met with no Objection, as projected for the Service of *Hanover*.

It has already been fully proved, that the defensive Alliance between his late Majesty and the late Emperor, concluded at *Westminster* May the 5th 1716, and concerted in much the same Terms as the foregoing Treaty with the *States*, was made with no other View or Design, but to defend and maintain the happy Establishment of the present Royal Family in these Kingdoms.

The defensive Alliance between *Great Britain*, *France*, and the *States*, concluded at the *Hague* Jan. the 4th 1717, has not yet been charged with any Electoral Influence.

The Quadruple Alliance between the late Emperor, *Great Britain*, and *France*, concluded at *London* ^{July 22.}_{August 2.} 1718, was made to settle the essential Points of the Treaty of *Utrecht*, relating to a perpetual Separation of the two Crowns of *France* and *Spain*; and to the Partition of the *Spanish* Monarchy between the late Emperor and *Spain*, by mutual Agreements and Renunciations; which last had been entirely omitted at the general Peace; and to put an End to the Troubles in *Italy*, which the *Spaniards* had raised by taking *Sardinia*, and making Preparations to invade *Sicily*; and lastly, to establish a general Pacification in *Europe*.

These were the Motives and Ends of that Alliance. But it may be proper to observe here, that as *Sicily*, by the Conditions of Peace in this Treaty between the Emperor and *Spain*, was given to his Imperial Majesty, he, by the same Article, agreed that the eventual Succession of *Tuscany*, *Parma*, and *Placentia*, should be granted to Don *Carlos*, upon their being declared Fiefs of the Empire; and there is an express Clause for taking Measures to secure the Succession to that Prince against all Events. This Observation, if duly consider'd, will serve to remove all the frivolous Objections that have been made against the Introduction of Don *Carlos* into those *Dutchies*, as having alienated the Emperor from us.

The next Treaty was concluded between his late Majesty, *France*, and *Spain*, *June* the 13th 1721.

It

It is in the nature of a plain defensive Alliance, with the Renewal of former Treaties and Conventions of Commerce between *Great Britain* and *Spain*; which, on account of the War that happened in Consequence of the Troubles in *Italy*, were become void; and therefore a formal Recital and Re-establishment of them was absolutely necessary for securing the ancient Rights and Privileges of Trade to *Spain* belonging to the *British* Subjects.

This, I suppose, is the secret Treaty of *Madrid*, which the Libeller touches upon, as what could *not only effect the Reduction of the overgrown Power of the House of Austria within a proper Bound*; and indeed is so far from it, that the very Perusal of this Treaty (which by the by was not a secret Treaty) will shew that it was incapable of giving any just Cause of Offence to the Court of *Vienna*, and that it is equally impossible to trace either from the Occasion, the Articles, or Consequences of it, any Footsteps that could at all concern the Interest of *Hanover*.

It was about this Time that the Letter, so much talked of, relating to the Restitution of *Gibraltar*, was wrote by the late King. But as even the strongest Misrepresentation, the most far-fetch'd Construction or Interpretation, cannot possibly make the least Connection between *Gibraltar* and *Hanover*, which is the Question in Dispute; I shall only observe, that notwithstanding what the Libeller says about *Surrendering it to pacify the Heart-burnings of the Court of Spain*, that Fortress is still in the Possession of the Crown of *Great Britain*,

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We come now to the famous Treaty of *Hanover*, concluded between his late Majesty, *France* and *Prussia*, Sept. the 3d 1725, which has been loaded by the Enemies of the Government with so many hard Names and scandalous Invectives, as calculated and framed purely for the sake of *Hanover*, and that for no other reason in the World, but because it was signed at *Herenhausen*, and is commonly called the *Hanover Treaty*.

The Libeller, in taking Notice of this Alliance, industriously avoids (and indeed it was necessary for his wicked Purpose) to make the least mention of the Treaties concluded some Months before between the late Emperor and *Spain*, which were the real and unavoidable Occasion of making (as will be shewn immediately) that of *Hanover*, for Reasons of State that concerned the Interest of *Great Britain* only.

It has been said before, that the Emperor had agreed, by the Quadruple Alliance, to grant the eventual Succession of *Tuscany*, *Parma*, and *Placentia*, to *Don Carlos*: It is here to be remarked, that his Imperial Majesty, by the same Treaty, had undertaken to procure from the Empire, of which those Dutchies had been declared Fiefs, the Letters Expectative, containing the eventual Investiture of them for *Don Carlos*, and cause them to be delivered to the King of *Spain* within two Months after the Exchange of the Ratifications.

It was likewise agreed, that there should be
a Con-

a Congress, to settle, under the Mediation of *Great Britain* and *France*, all the remaining Points for establishing a Peace between the Emperor and *Spain*.

A Congress was accordingly appointed at *Cambray*. The King of *Spain* acceded to the Quadruple Alliance *Jan.* the 20th 1720. N. S. But the Court of *Vienna* did not produce the Letters Expectative until *Nov.* 1723, almost three Years after that Accession, which by the Treaty should have been delivered within two Months; and until those Letters were delivered, no Provision could be made, or Measures taken, to secure that eventual Succession, as had been agreed, to *Don Carlos*; and consequently nothing of Moment could be done, or indeed was done at *Cambray* during that whole Time.

Riperda's full Powers for negotiating at *Vienna* this new Alliance between the Emperor and *Spain* were sign'd in *Nov.* 1724; and after his having negociated secretly there for some Time, the Court of *Madrid* received Advice from him the 14th of *March* 1725, that the principal Articles were then agreed. The Treaties themselves were sign'd, that of Peace and Friendship the 30th of *April*, and that of Commerce the 1st of *May*, 1725, without the least Intimation or Participation made to *England* or *France*, although the Congress then subsisted at *Cambray* under their joint Mediation.

The first of these Treaties was not liable to great Objection, though the Article in it by which *Spain* agreed to guarantee the Succession of the *Austrian* Dominions according to the *Pragmatic*

matic Sanction, gave room to suspect that it was to operate in Favour of *Spain*.

That the Treaty of Commerce granted to the Emperor's Subjects several Advantages in Trade, with respect to the *East* and *West-Indies*, contrary to the Treaties subsisting between *Spain* and the Maritime Powers, appeared plainly by the strong and ample Representations which the *States General* caused to be made to the Court of *Spain* on that Subject.

Whilst this extraordinary and unnatural Coalition between two such inveterate Enemies, was negotiating at *Vienna*, there was great Reason to suspect that some Points of a more dangerous Tendency to the Interest of this Nation, than what appeared in those publick Treaties, were in Agitation at the same Time; And a full Discovery was soon afterwards made of them, by the most positive and explicit Intelligence, from different Persons, all capable of knowing the Truth of this Matter, and all concurring in the most material Facts, without any Intercourse or Relation with one another, *viz.*

That the two Archdutchesses should be married to the two Infants of *Spain*.

That the Emperor should concur in employing Force for restoring *Gibraltar* to *Spain*, if it could not be effected by good Offices.

That the King of *Spain* should in like manner support the *Ostend* Company in their Trade to the *East-Indies*.

There

There was likewise an Article relating to the Means to be taken for placing the Pretender on the Throne of *Great Britain*.

As to the Marriage of the Archdutchesses to the Infants of *Spain*, besides the private Intelligence, the Truth of that Agreement was manifested in the Course of several subsequent Negotiations.

The Steps that were immediately taken after the Ratifications of the Treaties of *Vienna*, in Support of the Articles relating to *Gibraltar* and the *Ostend* Company, were so notorious and publick, that the Opponents rather endeavoured to palliate and evade, than absolutely to deny the Truth of them.

But with Regard to any Design in Favour of the Pretender, it is said, that the late Emperor himself ordered his Ministers to give, in his Name, and directly from himself, the most solemn Denial to this Fact, which ought to have greater Weight than any Intelligence which his late Majesty himself might have had from any other Person.

Decency with Regard to the Memory of the first Sovereign in *Europe*, who is now no more, and the present happy and good Understanding between his present Majesty and the Queen of *Hungary*, commands my Silence in Answer to that Assertion: But I cannot forbear adding, that besides other concurring Evidences, a Person of the greatest Rank, Veracity and Credit, who gave the late King the Intelligence on this Head,

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affirmed,

affirmed, to have read the Article relating to the Pretender; and it is very remarkable, that the Elector of *Bavaria*, the present Emperor, had likewise received Assurances equally strong from the Ministers of *Vienna*; that nothing had been transacted between that Court and the Court of *Madrid*, relating to any Marriage of an Archduchess to an Infant of *Spain*, which has since been owned by the *Imperial* Ministers; and the Execution of it openly demanded by those of *Spain*.

And here it may be proper to observe by the by, that if those Matches had taken Place, and the *French* King, and the Prince of *Asturias* at that Time, both Princes of very weak and delicate Constitutions, had died without Issue, it would have laid the Foundation for the most formidable Power ever known in *Europe*, by uniting together in one Sovereign all the Dominions belonging to the Houses of *Austria* and *Bourbon*. This possible Contingency gave a general Alarm to the rest of *Europe*, for no body complained of the present exorbitant Power of the House of *Austria*. This indeed *might have been a political Bugbear*, as the *Libeller* says, and never entered into any Body's Brain, or came out of any Body's Mouth but his own.

In Consequence of these Treaties (projected, as the Opponents say, for no other End but that of a Reconciliation between the Emperor and *Spain*) great Sums, amounting to about a Million Sterling, were remitted in six Months, from the signing of them, by *Spain* to *Vienna*.

The Court of *Vienna* gave immediately the necessary Orders for an Augmentation of their own Forces,

Forces, with 30,000 Men, and took immediately into their Pay 30,000 more.

Negotiations were set on Foot for engaging other Powers in Support of their Cause, and particularly *Russia*, by her Accession, was to furnish 30,000 Men.

These Facts and Measures were so glaring and irresistible, that it was necessary for the Calumniators of his late Majesty's Counsels, to find out some colourable Pretence for this sudden and unexpected Alliance, without the least Notice of it to the Mediators at *Cambray*, and without the least Offence or Provocation given by the Maritime Powers.

Why truly the Mediators having for several Years, in vain, endeavoured to reconcile those two Powers, the late Emperor, and King of *Spain*, resolved to do it by themselves without the Intervention of any other Power, especially since *France* had affronted *Spain* by sending back the *Infanta*, and *England* had refused to continue her Mediation at *Cambray* without *France*.

Let us consider the true State of these Facts. It has been shewn already from the Behaviour of the Court of *Vienna*, why nothing was, or could be done at the Congress of *Cambray* for several Years after it had been appointed, and *Spain* had acceded to the Quadruple Alliance; and in Fact the Congress was not opened in Form till *January* 1724, N. S. What passed then there, for some Time, was of no great Moment, and was purely to save Appearances: The Intrigues for sending *Riperda* privately to *Vienna* were then on

Foot, and his full Powers for negotiating were signed the same Year in *November*; and that the sending back the *Infanta* by *France* could have no Share in the Motives for negotiating, nor the Refusal of the sole Mediation by *England*, in the Dispatch for concluding those Treaties, will evidently appear by stating and comparing the Dates of those Transactions together.

At the same time that *Riperda* was sent to *Vienna* to carry on a clandestine Negotiation there, Marshal *Tesse*, the *French* Ambassador at *Madrid*, a great Favourite of King *Philip*, and one in whom he had the greatest Confidence, had given the strongest Assurances to that Prince; that the *Fiançailles* for the *French* King's Marriage of the *Infanta* should be compleated at the time appointed, and the Marquis de *Monteleon*, the *Spanish* Ambassador at *Paris*, received the same Assurances from the Duke of *Bourbon*; and Preparations were making at that time in *France* for that Purpose. But his most Christian Majesty being taken soon after very ill, and in great Danger of his Life by a Fever in *February* 1725, *N. S.* alarmed the whole *French* Nation, and made them cry aloud for his marrying immediately upon his Recovery to prevent the fatal Consequences of a Civil War, in Case of his dying without Issue Male.

It was thereupon suddenly resolved in Council to send back the *Infanta*: The Courier dispatched to signify that Resolution to *Spain*, *March* 13, 1725, arrived there the 19th. The Surprise and Astonishment of their Catholick Majesties was so great, as shewed plainly, that it was a most unexpected Stroke.

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His late Majesty's sole Mediation was soon after proposed to Mr. *Stanhope*, the then *British* Ambassador at *Madrid*: He immediately dispatch'd a Messenger to *England*, with that Offer, and the late King's Answer, declining the sole Mediation, arrived in *Spain* the 24th of *April* 1725, N. S.

Compare these Dates with those relating to the Negotiation and Conclusion of the *Vienna* Treaties.

Riperda's full Powers were sign'd in *November* 1724, and the Court of *Madrid* receiv'd Advice from him in *March* 1725, that the principal Articles were then agreed at *Vienna*.

In Consequence of this Agreement, the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the Emperor and *Spain* was sign'd at *Vienna* the last of *April* and that of Commerce the first of *May* 1725.

Now could the Resolution of sending back the *Infanta*, that was not thought of in *France* till *March* 1725, nor known at *Madrid* till the 19th of that Month, be the Occasion of negotiating at *Vienna*, Treaties of such Importance and long Discussion, the principal Articles of which, were the very same Month of *March*, known at *Madrid* to have been agreed upon at *Vienna*?

Or could the late King's Refusal of the sole Mediation, which was not known at *Madrid*, till the 24th of *April* 1725, N. S. have possibly occasioned

occasioned the signing of Treaties at *Vienna* the last of *April*, and the first of *May* 1725; to which it may seem unnecessary to add, that the Acceptance of the sole Mediation to accommodate the Differences between two Courts, who were already agreed in every respect, would have been as ridiculous and absurd, as it is to imagine that the declining of it could possibly be a Motive for signing of Treaties so injurious to the States, as well as to *Great Britain*, when neither of them had given the least Reason for such a Treatment.

There is no Intricacy in these Facts, they are plain and naked, they neither have nor want the Gloss of any *artificial or delusive Pretences*. I shall borrow my Conclusion on this Head, from what was said by one of the *British Ambassadors* at *Cambray*, the late Lord *Mar—nt*, who was perfectly well acquainted with the Transactions of those Times.

That able Minister, in answer to those frivolous Excuses, such as sending back the *Infanta*, and declining the sole Mediation, as the Occasion for making those Treaties, reply'd,
 “ That the Courts of *Vienna* and *Madrid* had
 “ indeed done a most wonderful Work, for they
 “ had negotiated and concluded the most extraordinary and extensive Alliance, in less
 “ Time, and with greater Dispatch, than the
 “ most diligent Courier could have gone back-
 “ wards and forwards between *Madrid* and
 “ *Vienna*.”

Now can any one presume to say, without impudently braving the face of Truth and Reason, that his late Majesty, after such undoubted Evidences

dences in Facts, of Designs concerted against the most essential Interests of this Nation, and supported by such vigorous and warlike Preparations, should have sat still and unconcern'd, and not strengthened himself with such Counter-Alliances, as might enable him to disappoint or defeat those Designs! How loud would the Clamours have been against the then Administration, as guilty of the greatest Indolence and Folly, had they neglected to make Treaties, and concert Measures for the Security of our present Establishment, the Preservation of the *British* Rights and Possessions, and of the Peace and Balance of *Europe*.

Let us now consider, as briefly as possible, that *pernicious* Treaty of *Hanover* made on this Occasion, and the Steps taken in Consequence of it.

It was concluded between his late Majesty, *France*, and *Prussia*, *September* the 23d, 1725, above four Months after those of *Vienna*: It is conceiv'd in the usual Terms of an Alliance purely defensive, with a mutual Guarantee to protect the respective Countries, Rights, and Privileges, those of Commerce in particular, which the Contracting Parties actually enjoy, or ought to enjoy, as well out of, as in *Europe*, which certainly had a View to the *Ostend* Company; but without the least Reflection, directly or implicitly, upon the Conduct of any other Power: Nor can the most willing and malicious Caviller point out an Expression in it, or draw an Inference from it, or from the Measures taken in Consequence of it, to shew that it was projected to encrease the Electoral Dominions and Claims, or to involve *Great Britain* in the Quar-

Quarrels of *Hanover*, or could give the least Offence to any but those that intended to offend.

The Measures and Motions, pursued in Consequence of this Treaty, by an Augmentation of Forces, and by procuring the Accession of other Powers, only followed and kept pace with the Measures and Motions of the same Nature that were pursued in Consequence of the Treaties of *Vienna*, in order to obviate, prevent and resist, if necessary, the Execution of such Views contained in those Treaties, as manifestly tended to disturb this Government, to invade the Possessions and Privileges of *Great Britain*, and to trouble the Tranquility of *Europe*. Such prudent and proper Precautions, timely taken, obtain'd the desir'd End, (and what indeed was the only End of the *Hanover* Treaty) that of preventing a General War, by signing in *May* 1727, Preliminary Articles for putting Things on the foot they were before the making of the Treaties of *Vienna* and *Hanover*.

And now what a profligate and abandoned Heart must this Libeller have, in proclaiming to the People of *Great Britain*, *That this Alliance was calculated only for the Preservation of the Lower Saxony, or rather to support and defend the new Possessions and Claims of the Electorate of Hanover; to reduce the exorbitant Power of the House of Austria within a proper Bound; and that the Millions squander'd by us on that Occasion, and under that Pretence, served only to exhaust ourselves, and avenge the Cause of Hanover upon that House.*

How wicked and dangerous, not to say traitorous, must his Design be, in so false a Representation

sentation of a Treaty, that has nothing in it concerning *Hanover* but the Title, or Name only.

The Preliminaries of 1727 were not immediately executed on the Part of *Spain*, not on account of any Obscurity in them, but because the late King dying within a Month after signing them, their *Catholick* Majesties were made to believe by the unfortunate *English* abroad, and particularly the late Bishop of *Rockester*, that his present Majesty's Accession to the Throne would be interrupted by Civil Broils: This made them raise Cavils against some of the Articles, which were afterwards removed by an Act sign'd at the *Pardo, March*, 1728.

In Consequence of this Act, a Congress of the Ministers of all the Powers concern'd on either Side was held, at *Soissons*; Matters were so managed there, that the Imperial Plenipotentiaries were drawn into a separate Negotiation of a Plan for a general Treaty.

The *Spaniards* were so exasperated at this Proceeding, that as long as the Congress held, their Time was employ'd in making the most pressing and reproachful Instances to the Emperor's Ministers, to fulfil the Articles of the secret Treaty, particularly with regard to the Marriages between the two Families; to which they having receiv'd nothing but dilatory and evasive Answers, their *Catholick* Majesties highly resented this Treatment, and from bitter Expostulations, they came in a manner to a direct Breach with the Emperor, which brought about the Treaty of *Seville*, concluded *November* the 9th,

1729, N. S. between his Majesty, *France*, and *Spain*.

If some extraordinary Articles of the *Vienna* Treaties, *which were the Basis of the Hanover Treaty*, are look'd upon by the Libeller and his Friends, *to be Absurdities and Impracticabilities*, yet if they were, as they have in fact been proved, actually stipulated by those Treaties, those Absurdities can be charged upon nobody but the Authors of those Treaties; nor indeed were they otherwise absurd, than as they proved impracticable by the wise Precautions taken in Consequence of the Hanover Treaty, to prevent their being carried into Execution.

But sure I am there cannot be a greater Absurdity, than to say, *That it was not to be imputed to those who advised it; that we were not drawn by it into a War with the Emperor*; as if his late Majesty and his Ministers, by making an Alliance purely defensive, in Opposition to Treaties of a most injurious Nature to the Rights and Possessions of this Kingdom, and by taking Measures to disappoint and oppose the Execution of vigorous Measures, visibly and previously taken in support of those injurious Engagements, should be reproached as intending to make War upon the Emperor; A most preposterous Way of reasoning, entirely subverting the Nature of Things; Security and Defence are to be call'd Violence and Injustice, and the Motives and Means for preserving Peace, sounding the Trumpet for a War; when 'tis certain, that if these Motives and Means had not been pursued, and the Designs of the *Imperial and Spanish* Courts not been prevented,

vented, a General War in *Europe* must unavoidably have ensued.

But that a War with Spain (says the Libeller) *was the Consequence of it, (the Hanover Treaty) cannot be denied, at least a half-War.* Let us see how that Matter stands;

The *Spaniards* having laid Siege to *Gibraltar* the 22d of *February*, 1726-27, the Opponents upbraided the *British* Administration most severely; for our Allies the *French* not taking part in our Quarrel.

Now *France* voluntarily offer'd to make it a *Casus fœderis*: But as a Plan of Preliminaries for an Accommodation was then depending at *Vienna*, as it was very certain that *Gibraltar* was impregnable, and the Siege was undertaken by *Spain* with no other View, than to bring Matters to an open Rupture, and to disappoint the Effect of those Preliminaries; That Offer on the Part of *France* was prudently declined by *England*; for as long as the Emperor committed no Hostilities, we were desirous that *France* should lye quiet too; because a General War must have been the necessary Consequence of her entering upon Action, which the Treaty of *Hanover* was made to prevent; and therefore nothing can be more evident than that the Conduct of *Great Britain* shewed how attentive his late Majesty was to avoid if possible a War, and particularly a War with the Emperor; and that with *Spain* did not last above three Months.

The Libeller owns himself that *Hanover* was not a Gainer by it, but the Emperor in the End be-

came very sufficiently a *Loser*. How does he make out this *Loss*? Why, *The Electoral Designs upon Mecklenberg were not relished at the Court of Vienna, tho' so mighty a Confederacy was formed to persuade him to it; therefore the Emperor was still too great and formidable. To be Friends with Spain was our Interest upon any Terms; and we solicited the Honour of being Convoys to Don Carlos to Italy; and This is called a Reduction of the still too powerful House of Austria.* Now I may defy this Writer with all his Penetration, Search, and Intelligence, to procure one Fact, either by way of Instruction, Negotiation, or otherwise, to prove directly, or by Inference, that there was ever the least Connection between the Affairs of *Mecklenberg* and the Treaty of *Hanover*, or *Seville*, or one Step taken in Consequence of them, that at all related to that Dutchy; and as to the Introduction of *Don Carlos* into *Italy*, in order to take Possession of *Tuscany*, *Parma*, and *Placentia*, it has been shewn, that the eventual Succession of those Dutchies was granted to him by a Treaty, in which the Emperor was an original contracting Party; that he had readily consented to it, and to the Means stipulated for securing it to that Prince, as a Condition for his Imperial Majesty's having the immediate Cession of *Sicily*; and a solemn Renunciation on the Part of *Spain*, for such of the Dominions of the *Spanish* Monarchy as were already in his Possession.

Twelve Years had passed without any Care being taken for securing that Reversion to *Don Carlos*, by putting, according to the Quadruple Alliance, *Swiss* or *English* Garrisons into *Leghorn*, *Porto Ferrajo*, *Parma* and *Placentia*, which ought to have been done within two Months after the Accession

Accession of *Spain* to that Treaty ; and for which *Great Britain* was in a particular Manner become a Guarantee : And therefore, although six Thousand *Spanish* instead of Neutral Troops were, by virtue of the Treaty of *Seville*, to be introduced into those Places, yet this Variation, made necessary by such long and affected Delays, could give no just Offence to his Imperial Majesty, supposing him sincerely desirous that what he had agreed to in so solemn a Manner, and for which he had receiv'd so great an Equivalent, should take Effect.

However, Affairs were so conducted, that this Introduction was made in a peaceable Manner, and with the Concurrence of all Parties concerned.

For by the 3d Article of the Treaty concluded between the Emperor and his Majesty, *March* the 16th, 1731, his Imperial Majesty engages not only not to oppose the *Spanish* Garrisons, but to employ his good Offices and Authority, with the Possessors of those Dutchies, to consent to the quiet Admission of them ; and in Consequence of this Engagement, the Duke of *Parma* being dead, such proper Dispositions were made, and Precautions taken, by virtue of several Acts and Declarations, signed the same Year 1731, between the Emperor, his Majesty, the King of *Spain*, and the Duke of *Tuscany*, that *Don Carlos*, with six Thousand *Spaniards*, was receiv'd and amicably settled in *Italy* by the unanimous Consent of all the Powers that could be any ways interested in that Affair.

Now, in the Name of Truth, how can this Transaction, in which the King had no View,
or

or Concern, but in that Quality only, possibly have any Relation to his Views, or Concerns, as Elector in *Germany*, and particularly to the Dutchy of *Mecklemburg*? How can an Article of the Treaty of *Seville*, executed in Concert with the Emperor, and founded upon the Quadruple Alliance, to which his Imperial Majesty was originally a contracting Party, and which was made seven Years before the Treaty of *Hanover*, be charged, as a Consequence of this last Treaty, with an Intention to reduce the too great and formidable House of *Austria*.

Yet the Libeller infers from hence, *that the House of Austria declined in exact Proportion, as that of Bourbon flourished.*

But can it be imagined, that the Emperor would have consented so readily, and in so formal a Manner, to the eventual Succession of those Dutchies, in Favour of *Don Carlos*, had he thought that his Acquisition of *Sicily* would not have been a sufficient Balance against it. He obtained besides, by agreeing only to so small a Variation, as the Introduction of *Spanish*, instead of neutral Garrisons into those Dutchies, the Guarantee of the Maritime Powers for preserving the indivisible Succession of all his hereditary Dominions in his own Family, according to his Pragmatic Sanction, by the above-mentioned Treaty concluded between his Imperial Majesty and the King, *March* 16, 1731, and acceded to by the States *February* 20, 1732.

One would have thought that this Treaty, made so much in Favour of the House of *Austria*, and for maintaining it in its ancient Strength and Lustre,

Lustre, might have had the *Libeller's* good Word, or at least the good Fortune to escape his Censure. No; nothing done in his late, or present Majesty's Reign, can possibly be right: And therefore he immediately cries out, We guarantee the Pragmatic Sanction, *Hand over Head*; and even, *in this Affair*, Hanover *acts upon a separate Bottom*, provides for her own Satisfaction, with all imaginable Secrecy and Address; and then accedes to a Treaty, which was irreconcilable with all her former Pursuits, &c.

This new Treaty, which dissolved the never to be forgotten, Hanover Treaty, was entered into contrary to an express Article of the last, which obliged each of the contracting Parties, not to enter into any new Engagements with any other Power, without a Communication first made to the rest of the Confederacy. This France at once resented and despised, &c.

Again, *This new Negotiation was as much a Secret at the Hague, as at Versailles; for when it was communicated to the States, they were at the same time informed, that Hanover was already satisfied. But tho' Great Britain followed the Example, or perhaps obeyed the Prescription of Hanover, Holland did not appear to do the same; and tho' the Accession of the States was at last obtained, it was not without Difficulties and Limitations, tho' we were obliged to swallow the Dose without gilding, or any Palliative whatever.*

Thus we see the Emperor, England and Holland once more in Articles, with Hanover for the Head of the Confederacy.

Now

Now was ever such a Medley of confused, wild, and incompatible Ideas, jumbled together without the least Colour of Reason to support them; and that they have no Foundation, but pure Malice against his Majesty's Government, will appear by the plain State of Facts in order of Time.

The Misunderstanding between the Emperor and *Spain*, in Consequence of what had passed at the Congress of *Soissons*, and the Conclusion of the Treaty of *Seville*, to which the *States* had acceded, brought the Court of *Vienna* to reflect seriously upon her ungracious and ungrateful Behaviour towards the Maritime Powers, and to intimate a Disposition to renew her former good Understanding with her ancient and useful Allies, by removing, in a formal Treaty, all the Causes of the late Jealousies and Uneasiness between them; and by making the Guaranty of his Imperial Majesty's Succession, according to the Pragmatic Sanction, the Foundation of it; and altho' the *Libeller* impudently asserts, *that this Negotiation was as much a Secret at the Hague, as at Versailles*, it was imparted in great Confidence to the Ministers, and some of the chief Men of the Republick; and it is well known, that a more open, or formal Communication, cannot be made to that Government of any Transaction, without exposing it to the Inconvenience of being immediately publick; and altho' he affirms, *with the same Veracity, that the States were not in haste to come into this Treaty*; their Accession suffered no greater Delay, nor was clogg'd with any other Difficulties or Limitations, then what are necessarily incident to the

the Nature of their Constitution. And here it may not be improper to observe, in Answer to what has been very frequent in the Writings and Speeches of the Revilers of his late and present Majesty's Measures, as if the Administration had entirely destroy'd all the Confidence, which the *Dutch* had formerly repos'd in this Nation, and we had no Credit or Regard left in that Country; that it is evident the States have been original contracting Parties, or have acceded to most of the Treaties made between *Great Britain* and other Powers, since the Establishment of this Family, which can't be suspected to have been done with a View to the aggrandizing of the Electoral Dominions.

They were original contracting Parties to the triple Alliance made *January 1, 1717*.

They acceded to the Treaty of *Hanover* made *September 3, 1725*.

They were Parties to the Preliminaries signed in 1727, and to the Act of the *Pardo* in 1728.

They acceded to the Treaty of *Seville* made in 1729.

They acceded to the Treaty of *Vienna* made *March 16, 1731*.

They did not accede to the Treaty concluded in 1716, because the Negotiations coming on, for that of 1717, made it unnecessary.

They had taken a Resolution to accede to the Quadruple Alliance of 1718, but the secret Articles for employing Force to compel other
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Powers to come into it, frightened them from it, still feeling most grievously the Smart of the Wounds they had received from the late ruinous War; or, rather, the more ruinous Peace at *Utrecht*, which has made them ever since dread the Danger of new Troubles.

Their Accession was never demanded to the Treaty of 1721 with *Spain*, because it was made in Consequence of that Crown's Accession to the Quadruple Alliance, in which the States had no Concern.

But then the *Libeller*, and his Associates, say, that the States wisely took Care to add certain Limitations and Explanations for their own particular Advantage: But there is nothing in this Remark, but what, as was hinted before, arises from the Nature of their Government, which being composed of several Sovereign States, independent of each other; there will always be some, who purely perhaps to shew their own Significance, will criticise upon Words, or Articles; and insist upon certain Explanations for their own Satisfaction, which, altho' unnecessary, cannot be refused; but whoever will take the Trouble to examine these Explanations, will find that they make no Alteration in the Essence and Meaning of the Treaty.

But to return to the *Libeller's* Observation in Behalf of *France*, of our having made this Treaty, without any Communication of it to that Crown, contrary to an Article in the *Hanover* Alliance, allowing that to have been the Case: It is well known, that Mr. *Chauvelin* was no sooner made Secretary of State in *France*, by the Removal of M. *de Morville*, than the Management
of

of the Affairs there began to take a new Bias, which created Suspensions and Distrust in *England*, and by Degrees, a Coolness between the two Courts; and therefore the *Libeller's* Opinion of *French* Faith, on all Occasions, but where it is necessary to vilify the Conduct of his own Court, might have induced him to have had so much Candour and Regard for the King's Honour, as to suppose that the Behaviour of the *French* might have given his Majesty a justifiable Reason for such a separate Proceeding.

From what has been said on this Head, and from a bare Perusal of the Treaty itself: I am persuaded the Reader will be convinced, that neither the Occasion for making it, nor the Conditions in it, have any other Foundation, but the Interest of this Nation, and the Support of the House of *Austria*, as necessary for maintaining the Balance of *Europe*; and that the loose Sentences scattered here and there in three Pages, without the least Connection; such as *that Hanover in this Affair acts upon a separate Bottom, provides for her own Satisfaction with all imaginable Secrecy and Address.*—*That Great Britain followed the Example, or perhaps obey'd the Prescription of Hanover.*—*And that we see the Emperor, England and Holland, once more in Articles, with Hanover for the Head of the Confederacy,*—are nothing to the Purpose, and brought in by Head and Shoulders, only to sound the Word *Hanover*.

We come now to the Situation of Affairs upon the Death of the late King of *Poland*, which involved the late Emperor into a War alone with *France, Spain and Sardinia*, and cost his Son-in-Law the Loss of *Lorraine* in exchange for *Tuscany*,

and himself *Naples* and *Sicily* in exchange for *Parma* and *Placentia*: And to prove that all this is to be attributed to Electoral Views, the Libeller lets off at random all his Artillery relating to *Austria*, *Russia*, *Sleswick*, *Mecklemberg*, *Bremen*, and *Verden*, as if concerned in choosing *Stanislaus* King of *Poland*; and without any Reasoning or Deduction, or colour of Truth, concludes, *That supported by France on one hand, and Hanover on the other, Stanislaus was elected King of Poland.*—

— *The War* (he says) *in which the Emperor was involv'd on this Occasion, call'd loudly upon England, Holland, and Hanover, for Performance of the Guarantee they had so lately engaged in.*

Not to fatigue the Reader with too many Words, the Substance of what he says in Consequence of it is, *That the Ministers made use of it to encrease their Demands upon the People. Denmark as usual, lent her Name for Subsidies, which Hanover was not the worse for.*— *The Electorate sat still, our Resident in Holland acted the Farce of being importunate with the States to enter into Measures for the Preservation of the House of Austria, and setting a Bound to the growing Power of France.*— *Upon his repeated and urgent Applications, they gave him to understand, they were willing to meet his Offers half-way: When lo! It appeared he had no Powers to treat.*

Dates and Facts, those inseparable Companions of Truth, will soon, as they have already done, disperse such false and malicious Insinuations.

The King of *Poland* died $\frac{\text{January } 21}{\text{February } 1}$ 1732-3.
His Son, the Elector of *Saxony*, and *Stanislaus*,
were

were Candidates to succeed to that Crown; *Great Britain* employ'd her good Offices, and good Offices only, not in favour of *Stanislaus*, but of his Electoral Highness, and made no Difficulty of declaring it to the *French* Ministers.

The Declaration made in *March* 1733, by the Court of *France*, for supporting the *Poles* in a free Election; and that made in Answer to it, *April* following, by the Court of *Vienna*, for supporting too the Freedom of that Election, but according to the Constitution of that Kingdom (which last Words were construed to mean an Exclusion of *Stanislaus*) were conceived in such strong Terms, on both Sides, as gave too much Reason to apprehend a Rupture between those two great Powers.

These Apprehensions were encreased by the Measures concerted between the Imperial and *Russian* Ministers in *Muscovy* and *Poland*, to exclude *Stanislaus* from the *Polish* Throne, by forcible Means, and by the March of *Muscovite* Troops into *Lithuania* for that Purpose.

Great Britain and *Holland*, sensible of the Troubles that might in Consequence affect the general Tranquility of *Europe*, caused the most friendly and earnest Representations to be made so early as in *March* and *July* 1733, at *Vienna*, against the Imprudence of the Emperor's taking any Steps, that might hazard a War with *France*, on account of a *Polish* Election; a Contest so entirely foreign to all Concerns of the Maritime Powers, and to their defensive Alliance with the Emperor, as afforded little Hopes to expect that
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their People could possibly be brought into his Assistance, if attack'd on that Account.

In the mean time the States were informed, that the Court of *Vienna* would take Care of *Luxembourg* only, and leave the Security of the Barrier in the *Netherlands* to the Care of *Great Britain* and *Holland*: And having in *August* 1733, receiv'd from their Engineer, who had been sent to inspect the Condition of the Barrier Towns to be guarded by the *Austrians*, a Relation of their being in a most ruinous Condition, destitute of Troops, contrary to the exprefs Terms of the Barrier Treaty, and of every thing else necessary for a Defence, were so frightned, that they suddenly agreed to negotiate, and against his Majesty's Instances, signed *November* $\frac{1}{2}$ ³₀th, an Act of Neutrality with *France*, they promising not to take any Part in the Affair of *Poland*, upon the *French* engaging not to attack the Barrier in the *Low Countries*.

The *French* having gained the King of *Sardinia* to their Side, declared War, and marched their Army against the Emperor in *October* 1733. His Imperial Majesty, in Consequence of it, made the most earnest Instances in *England* and *Holland* for Succours. The *French* as earnestly represented the *Austrians* to have been the Aggressors, by their violent Proceedings, in Concert with *Russia*, to exclude *Stanislaus*, and interrupt the Freedom of a *Polish* Election.

Great Britain and *Holland*, without deciding upon that nice Point relating to the Existence of the *Casus fœderis*, and without refusing the Succours demanded by the Emperor, declared, that they

they could not explain themselves on that Head, until they had endeavour'd to accommodate Matters, by employing their good Offices for that End.

The Tender of their good Offices was made to, and readily accepted by *France*; but the Emperor having rejected them, for several Months together, gave *France* a great Advantage over him, by justifying her Conduct in continuing the War, from his Obstinacy in refusing to hearken to a Mediation for putting an End to it.

During these Transactions for procuring a Pacification, the rapid Progress of the Confederate Arms, by the Accession of *Spain*, in *Italy* (where the Imperial Fortresses were in the same Condition as those in *Flanders*) and the little Resistance the *French* met with in *Germany*, alarmed all *Europe*, and made his Majesty think it necessary, against all Events, to augment his National Troops, and to engage a Body of 6000 *Danes*, to be in Readiness to march, as Occasion might require.

Thus provided, he endeavoured to animate the States with the most pathetick Representations of the fatal Consequences from *France's* being suffered, under Colour of a Quarrel about a *Polish* Election, to extend her Conquests in their Neighbourhood, and to endanger the Balance of Power in *Europe*, upon which the Security and Trade of the Maritime Powers depend.

Altho' these Representations did not answer the desired End of engaging the States to enter jointly with *England* upon Action, yet they were
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encouraged to concur in holding such Language to the Ministry of *France*, as made an Impression upon Cardinal *Fleury*, and induced him, for fear of a general War, to hasten the Negotiation with the Imperial Court, and settle the Articles of Peace without the Concert of his Allies: *Mantua*, the Key of *Italy*, by this Means was saved, and an End was put to the War, not without some Loss to the Emperor, but with much less than was expected from the advantageous Situation of his Enemies; to which may be added, besides the uncertainty of Success, against so powerful a Confederacy, the Difficulties his Majesty would have been under to assist the Emperor alone, in a Quarrel occasioned by a Motive so distant from the Interest of *Great Britain*, especially, when in the beginning of these Troubles the opposing Patriots in Parliament, (tho' they now hold a different Language) and particularly that able Member who now treats *France* as a most contemptible Power, declared loudly, That it would be the greatest Madness and Folly, to concern ourselves in this Cause, or the Consequences of it, unless the *Dutch*, who must be more nearly and sooner affected than *England*, would take the Lead, or at least join with us, in a proportionable Expence.

This short and plain Narrative of the Conduct observed by *Great Britain* in so critical a Juncture of Affairs, from the King of *Poland's* Death, is submitted, without any Comment, to the impartial Reader, as a sufficient Answer to all the scandalous Insinuations of the infamous Libeller on this Article.

And

And now I think I have fully proved that his late and present Majesty's Views, in all their foreign Negotiations and Treaties, as well as the Steps taken in Consequence of them, from their happy Accession to the Throne, to the Time of the present Troubles in *Europe*, have been entirely governed by the fundamental and necessary Rule ever since the Peace of *Utrecht*, of *preventive and defensive Measures*, in which the Security and Interests of *Great Britain*, with the Balance and Peace of *Europe*, have solely been consulted, independent of *Hanover*, or of any other Consideration whatsoever.

It must be confessed, that *these preventive and defensive Measures*, though founded upon the known Principles of Wisdom, Honour, and Justice, may be liable to some seeming Inconveniences, which afford a Handle to envious and malignant Spirits to pervert and misrepresent them in odious Colours, and make them the Grounds of Jealousy and Uneasiness in a Free Nation, so subject as this, to Inconstancy and Delusion.

They have not the dazzling Glory and Eclat of military Operations, which amuse and please the giddy Multitude; they depend upon Negotiations of a slow and dilatory Nature, which wear out the Patience of warm and sanguine Politicians; they require the Expence of some extraordinary Sums, to be laid out with greater Secrecy than is necessary in a War where the Enemies are known and declared; and this, tho' but a Trifle compared with the immense Charges and Calamities of a War, is ever misconstrued, as intended to serve the private Views of the

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King or his Ministers. They are sometimes disappointed by the capricious or ambitious Humour of an unsteady Power, with whom they have been concerted, which never fails to be charged upon the Want of Confidence in the *English* Administration: And if they procure the End proposed of obviating or diverting the intended Mischief, they are liable to this unjust Reproach, that the Mischief was never intended, because it was not executed; that is, because it was prevented; as if a Person by using the proper Means to check or stop a Fever, when the Symptoms of one are visibly upon him, shou'd be ridiculed afterwards for an unnecessary Precaution, because the Fever was diverted; or as if a proper Posture of Defence, that may have disappointed a premeditated Assault, shou'd be exposed as occasioned by a groundless Alarm, because the Assault was not made.

His present and late Majesty's Counsels and Measures, projected and framed with no other View but to protect and preserve their faithful Subjects of *Great Britain* in Peace and Prosperity, without involving them in the Miseries of a War, ever detrimental to a free and trading Nation, have met with this barbarous and ungrateful Treatment from the Malice of the Disaffected, in order to blacken and shake a Government they would gladly see subverted, and from the Envy of the Disappointed, in order to vilify and run down the Administration, to whose Places they wanted to succeed.

These Miscreants cover their seditious Views, with a pretended Concern for the Welfare of the People, and endeavour to keep them daily
alarmed

alarmed with the Danger of Slavery from Standing Armies, and of Poverty from the Loss of Trade, although their Liberties have been enjoy'd to a greater Extent, and the Commerce of this Nation has been in a more flourishing State during the Reign of this Royal Family, than was ever known in the same Period of Time before; and indeed the Happiness that every honest Briton may securely enjoy in his own Vineyard under this Government, where the Sovereign has made the Law of the Land the Standard and Rule of all his Actions, is so conspicuous, that the malevolent Opposers, despairing of their being able to compass their wicked Ends, from their Misrepresentations of the Civil Policy at home, are forced to have Recourse to foreign Transactions, which being in their Nature intricate and uncertain, and subject to various Incidents and Turns, according to the Conduct of the several Powers, either immediately concern'd, or in Consequence affected by them, are also subject to various Comments and Constructions; and the Generality of People having neither Knowledge or Time enough to consider and examine the real Causes and Springs of Things at such a Distance, are often misled and hurry'd away into a false Credulity of malicious Interpretations, embellished with Eloquence, and supported with bold Assertions, especially when a Prince of a foreign Birth is upon the Throne of this Kingdom.

It can never be forgotten how industriously the *Jacobite* Faction, in Conjunction with a discontented Party, that distinguish'd themselves by the Name of *Old Whigs*, misrepresented all the good Actions of our glorious Deliverer, King *William*; although he saved the Church of *Eng-*
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land, he was basely charged with an Intention to establish Presbytery here instead of it; and the Church was said to be in Danger during his whole Reign; and while in Consequence of the first Grand Alliance he commanded the Confederate Army, with no other View but to check the exorbitant Power of *France*, and to preserve the Liberties of *Europe*, from which ours are inseparable; he was charged, because he was *Stadholder* of *Holland*, with a Design of aggrandizing the Dominions and Power of the *States General*, our Rivals in Trade, to the Prejudice of the *British* Commerce.

The present Union of the Royal and Electoral Capacities in the same Person, born out of *England*, has furnish'd those of the same disaffected Principles, in Concert with pretended Patriots, with a Handle to asperse and misrepresent all his late and present Majesty's Views and Actions for the Good and Welfare of this Kingdom, as calculated for aggrandizing the Dominions of *Hanover*; and in Consequence of this general Aspersions, all their Counsels and Steps. The *Danish*, *Hessian*, and *Wolfenbuttle* Troops retained from Time to Time in our Service, according to the Exigency of Affairs, as in former Reigns, are, by the Libeller, without the least Colour of Proof, represented to be *Hanover* Jobs, with a Design to ulcerate the Minds of the unwary Multitude with Suspicions and Discontent, the fatal Effects of which, if raised to a certain Degree, are but too obvious: But as the Deduction I have laid nakedly before the Reader, of plain Facts, relating to the Motives and Meaning of all our Treaties and Measures, will, I don't doubt, have convinced him of
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the Falſity and Wickedneſs of ſuch villanous Surmiſes; and that *Great Britain* has been put to no Charges but where the Intereſt of *Great Britain* has been immediately concerned, I am in no great Pain for thoſe Effects, and therefore I ſhall conclude this firſt Part, in Answer to the ſcandalous Libel, with one general Obſervation, which deſerves the Reader's Attention, *viz.*

That the Union of the Royal and Electoral Capacities in the ſame Perſon will ever be attended with one unavoidable, and indeed great Inconvenience to the Sovereign and Subjects of both Nations; whenever the King of *Great Britain* is obliged to purſue Meaſures neceſſary for preſerving the Rights and Priviledges of his *Britiſh* Subjects, that are diſagreeable to the Views of any other Power; that Power will not fail, in Revenge, to make uſe of any Handle to haraſs and perplex him in his Electoral Dominions; and whenever the Elector of *Hanover* is involved in Conteſts and Troubles with any Prince, or State, on account of his Electoral Pretenſions, that Prince, or State, will, in Reſentment, endeavour, if any Opportunity offers, to annoy him and his *Britiſh* Subjects in Matters relative to the Intereſt of *Great Britain*; and altho' it be impoſſible for *Great Britain* not to take a Part in either of theſe Caſes; in the laſt, for her own proper Defence and Security, and in the firſt, as a Point of Honour and Juſtice due to ſo conſiderable a Proteſtant Power in the Empire, even if it had no perſonal Connection with the King of *Great Britain*, yet ſuch a reaſonable and honeſt Conduct will be liable to malicious Interpretations and popular Clamour.

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The Power with whom his Majesty shall ever have any Disputes, either in the Quality of King, or Elector, knowing how odious a Thing it must be to the People of *England*, if they can be brought to think that their Riches and Strength are made subservient to the Views of *Hanover*, will be very industrious to make it appear an Electoral Cause; and as our Government is constituted, there will never be wanting a certain Number of disaffected and disappointed Wretches to abet and support, by false and malicious Glosses, the Arguments made use of for that Purpose, by the King's Enemies abroad, in order to distress his Majesty's Measures, and make them disagreeable and unpopular at Home.

This abominable and malignant Practice has been constantly pursued in all the virulent Writings of those in Opposition, ever since his late and present Majesty's Accession to the Throne; and if due and impartial Attention was had to this Observation, it would explain and confound all those unjust Calumnies and Outcries, which have from Time to Time been propagated with so much Artifice and Industry, to persuade the Nation, that *the Strength of the British Empire was, as the Libeller expresses it, to be steer'd by the Hanover Rudder.*

POSTSCRIPT,



P O S T S C R I P T.

SINCE writing the foregoing Sheets, I have run over a Pamphlet, entitled, *A Vindication of a Pamphlet, entitled, The Case of the Hanover Troops consider'd, &c. Being a Sequel of the said Pamphlet*, where the Author endeavours to supply the Defect of what has been loosely insinuated by his Brother Scribbler, relating to *Mecklemberg*, with various Quotations, accompanied with some Dates, and would infer from thence, that the Disputes about that Dutchy have been *one of the chief Springs of British Transactions upon the Continent*. But as it has been shewn by a plain and fair State of Facts, and Conclusions, that the Springs and Views of all the Treaties made, and Measures pursued by *Great Britain* in foreign Transactions, to the Death of the late Emperor, have taken their Rise from the Interest of *Great Britain* only, I don't doubt but the Reader, however prejudiced before, will, upon Reflection, be convinc'd that the Inferences made from those Quotations, can proceed from nothing but the grossest Ignorance, or the most inveterate Malice against his Majesty's Government.

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